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REVIEW
Trends in forensic DNA database: transnational exchange of DNA data
Aaron Opoku Amankwaa
Science and Justice Research Interest Group, School of Law, Northumbria University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK
ABSTRACT
The transnational exchange of forensic DNA data has become a modern trend in fighting
cross-border crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. Forensic DNA data allow the police to
identify, eliminate or link individuals associated with a crime. Additionally, different crime
scenes can be linked via the DNA profile to identify serial offenders or determine crime pat-
terns. Approaches to the transnational exchange of DNA data can be categorized into four:
(1) creation of an international DNA database, (2) linked or networked national DNA data-
bases, (3) request-based exchange of data, and (4) a combination of these. Most countries
operate the combination system of data exchange. This paper briefly introduces the different
approaches in the transnational sharing of forensic DNA data, the legislative and operational
framework, pattern of data exchange and participating states, and policy challenges associ-
ated with data sharing. Generally, most DNA exchange systems are modelled as the
European Union Pr€um regime. This operates under two stages: hit/no-hit query and further
information sharing. The scope of the data exchange is governed by individual national
legislation that determines the type of information that can be shared and the national
authority responsible for the system. Though DNA data exchange has been instrumental in
resolving serious crimes such as gang and serial rape, and armed robbery, adequate infor-
mation about their overall effectiveness and efficiency is lacking. Further, operational, legal
and ethical challenges including issues of privacy and proportionality appear to limit the full
potential of the DNA data exchange system.
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Introduction
With the increase in cross-border crime, the inter-
national exchange of intelligence for policing pur-
poses has become very necessary. Forensic DNA
data support police detective work through identifi-
cation of suspects/victims, elimination of individuals
from a criminal inquiry or association of individuals
to crime [1]. The power of forensic DNA data has
been enhanced through the establishment of DNA
databases, allowing the identification of unknown
offenders and serial offenders by linking different
crimes. Current trends in DNA database include the
expansion of national databases, innovative applica-
tion of databases (e.g. familial searching [2], analysis
of mobility of offenders and crime patterns [3,4]),
harmonization of international and domestic DNA
legislation and policies, and transnational exchange
of DNA records. Whilst databases may serve public
security interests, they pose a significant threat to
the civil liberties of individuals. Existing literature
indicates concerns about privacy (including
“function creep” and misuse of data), lack of data on
the overall effectiveness of databases and public edu-
cation gap about DNA databases [5–10].
This review focuses on approaches to forensic
DNA data exchange, which has become a common
trend over the last two decades. The paper briefly
introduces the legal and operational framework, pat-
tern of data exchange and participating states, and
policy challenges associated with data exchange. The
goal of the review is to enhance public and stake-
holder understanding of DNA database and inform
opinions about appropriate policies for DNA data-
bases and their uses, including the exchange of data.
Transnational exchange systems
The transnational exchange of DNA data involves
four main approaches: (1) international DNA data-
bases, (2) linked national DNA databases, (3)
request-based exchange of data, and (4) a combin-
ation of these [10–12]. As demonstrated in the next
sections, the combination system of data exchange
is employed by most countries engaged in the shar-
ing of forensic information.
International DNA databases
International DNA databases are either “global” or
regional. An example of the global system is the
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INTERPOL DNA Gateway platform that was estab-
lished in 2002 [12]. As of December 2017, more
than 84 countries were participating in the Interpol
DNA Database (IDD) with a holding of 173 000
DNA profiles [13]. According to a UK Home Office
release in 2015, the estimated time taken to
exchange DNA data through the Interpol process is
approximately 143 days [14,15]. The specific reasons
for this timescale are not reported. The UK is a par-
ticipant of the IDD and exports a limited number of
DNA profiles to the Interpol database [16]. The
IDD holds DNA profiles from convicted individuals,
suspects, missing persons and unidentified human
remains and crime scenes. The IDD excludes per-
sonal information of data subjects, and the profiles
are governed by the national laws of the submitting
law enforcement agency. For example, profiles origi-
nating from the UK will be subject to the rules set
out in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
[17]. This policy indicates that, overall, domestic
laws dictate access and uses of data and the protec-
tion of the rights of IDD data subjects. According to
Interpol [12,18], the database was instrumental in
Project Pink Panther (2007–2016), where a group of
individuals involved in transnational jewellery thefts
were apprehended.
Regional international DNA databases for crim-
inal investigations are limited. One well-established
regional criminal intelligence and information data-
base is the Europol Information System (EIS) which
includes a DNA database containing profiles from
European Union (EU) Member States [19]. The EIS
was established in 2005 and stores information on
serious international crime, convicted and suspected
individuals and other information related to crime.
Like the Interpol database, profiles stored on the
EIS are subject to national laws of the submitting
agency. Access to data stored on the EIS can be
restricted by the submitting agency and may only
allow access where a hit is obtained [19]. According
to Europol [20], the EIS holds more than 147 096
data of persons as of 2017. The Europol
Programming Document indicates the agency is
considering partnership with the EU Pr€um frame-
work to increase the scope and capabilities of its
DNA and biometric exchange system with third
countries [20,21].
Linked or networked national DNA databases
The EU Pr€um arrangement is modelled as a net-
work of separate national databases of member
countries [22,23]. Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain
signed the Pr€um Treaty on 27 May 2005. The
arrangement was adopted into EU legislation in
2008, requiring all member states to create a data-
base that can be accessed by other member coun-
tries. Council Decision 2008/615/JHA [22] and
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA [23] provide the
legal framework for the EU Pr€um regime. The types
of intelligence covered under Pr€um include DNA,
fingerprints and vehicle registration information.
The DNA data exchange operates under two stages:
hit/no-hit query and further information sharing
(articles 3, 4 and 5 of Council Decision 2008/615/
JHA [22]). In the first stage, DNA data from one
country is automatically searched on the database of
another country to identify any matches. If a match
is obtained, the case progresses to the second stage
where identifying information of the data subject is
shared with the requesting country. Currently, more
than 6 million subject profiles and 1 million crime
scene profiles are available for exchange, excluding
data from the UK [24]. Compared to the Interpol
exchange process, it takes approximately 15min to
exchange data via Pr€um [14]. The Pr€um regime
requires all EU states to establish national contact
points (NCPs) to facilitate and manage the exchange
of intelligence data (article 6 of Council Decision
2008/615/JHA [22]). The operation of the data
exchange scheme is governed by national legislation
that determines the powers of NCPs.
Within Europe, the largest national DNA data-
base is the UK National DNA Database (NDNAD),
holding > 6 million subject profiles and >590 thou-
sand crime scene profiles [25]. The large size of the
NDNAD is due to multiple factors. Firstly, it is the
oldest national DNA database in the world. Between
2001 and 2013, the minimum threshold for indefin-
ite inclusion on the NDNAD was an arrestee of a
recordable offence [7]. This was in contrast to the
legal system in most other EU countries, which
restrict inclusion to mainly serious crime offenders
and continuous retention to fixed periods [26].
Following the ruling in the Case of S. and Marper v.
the United Kingdom [27] in 2008, the rules govern-
ing DNA data have been changed in UK. The PoFA
rules currently require DNA data of unconvicted
people to be deleted after investigations or proceed-
ings, or after a short fixed period (2-3 years)
depending on the seriousness of offence [17]. Data
from convicted individuals are subject to indefinite
retention except some juveniles convicted of a first
minor offence. The new law requires all DNA sam-
ples to be destroyed after a profile has been gener-
ated or within 6months. Although these changes led
to the destruction of a considerable number of
DNA records, the NDNAD still holds more profiles
than other EU states [28].
In December 2015, the UK opted to participate
in the Pr€um regime and inquiries into EU–UK
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security cooperation indicates strong support to
retain the scheme post-Brexit [29–32]. A major lim-
iting factor for UK participation in Pr€um has been
variations in legislation. Available policy guidance
have set out specific conditions for UK participation
including the restriction of searching to data of con-
victed individuals, crime scene profiles and uniden-
tified human remains, and the establishment of an
independent Pr€um Oversight Board [29,33–35]. The
UK Biometrics Commissioner reports that arrange-
ments have been made to commence data exchange
in 2018 [9]. This will significantly increase the num-
ber of profiles available for exchange through Pr€um.
As part of the DNA exchange arrangement, the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) platform
owned by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
will be used to facilitate data exchange.
According to the Council of the EU [35], as of
September 2017, 24 member states were actively
exchanging DNA data with other member states
under the Pr€um regime. This number had not
increased at the end of June 2018 [21]. The non-
operational states are Croatia, Ireland, Italy and the
UK. Eight states were exchanging DNA data with
19–22 other states: the Netherlands (22), Germany
(20), Austria (20), Slovakia (20), Slovenia (19),
Romania (19), Hungary (19) and France (19). Five
states were connected to less than 10 other states:
Luxembourg (9), Bulgaria (8), Belgium (4),
Denmark (1) and Greece (receiving support from
the Netherlands). The remaining states are con-
nected to 13–18 other states.
A study by Santos and Machado [36] analysed
match data of operational states from 2011 to 2015.
The study utilized “unfiltered” match statistics from
the Pr€um exchanges. A match is obtained where
two independent profiles are the same or similar.
The match can be a confirmed one or not. The con-
firmed match is where an initial hit is further tested
to establish whether it is authentic or a false posi-
tive. The unfiltered matches are the initial hits from
the database and include false positives. This limita-
tion means that the findings from the study should
be interpreted cautiously.
Santos and Machado [36] found that five early
signatories of the initial Pr€um Treaty consistently
ranked high in the number of unfiltered matches
from 2011 to 2015: Austria (1 463–2 989), France
(737–5 666), Germany (4 532 –7 068), the
Netherlands (646–1 707) and Spain (908–2 443).
The study assessed the pattern of exchange by com-
puting the ratio of matches between a state’s
national database and external crime stain (OP-ES)
to match between outbound crime stain and exter-
nal national database (OS-EP). A high ratio shows
that a state’s national database is potentially more
beneficial to other states than the benefit it derives
from external national databases. In 2015, Romania
(7.47), Lithuania (4.71) and Hungary (4.46) recorded
the highest OP-ES/OS-EP. Overall, the study showed
a disproportionate impact of member states in the
transnational exchange of DNA data under the
Pr€um regime. Factors contributing to this observa-
tion include differences in legislation, size and age
of databases, variation in operational procedures,
criminal mobility patterns and uneven connection
between states. To assess the effectiveness of the
Pr€um regime, the study recommended a follow-up
of confirmed DNA hits through the criminal justice
process. Secondly, to improve transparency,
accountability and trust in the system, the study
highlighted the need to assess stage 2 of the Pr€um
regime. Previous studies have also made similar rec-
ommendations to ensure the sustainability of the
transnational exchange of DNA data [37,38].
Request-based exchange of DNA data
The request-based scheme of exchanging DNA
data is practiced by several countries around the
world. Countries with bilateral agreements allow
conditional automated searching of databases for
public security reasons. Features of this scheme
include the requirement that the exchange of DNA
information must be "necessary", "relevant" and
"proportionate" for a policing purpose and the pri-
oritization of serious crimes [39]. Generally, the
sharing of DNA data follows the two-stage process
of Pr€um. In the UK, the National Crime Agency
(NCA) manages the international exchange of
DNA data under this model [34]. The Interpol I-
24/7 network is used as a channel for sharing data.
One major disadvantage of this approach is the
time taken to share information. The process has
been described as time consuming compared to
other approaches [24,40]. The small number of
profiles exchanged under this approach may reflect
this challenge.
According to the UK Biometrics Commissioner’s
2017 report [9], 23 subject profiles (including 16
profiles of missing persons) and 166 crime scene
profiles (including 14 profiles of unidentified human
remains) were sent from the UK from January to
December 2017. Of the searches completed in for-
eign databases, the subject profiles yielded one posi-
tive or potential match, whilst the crime scene
profiles yielded 13 matches. Within the same period,
107 subject profiles and 619 crime scene profiles
were sent to the UK. The respective matches were
nine for the subject profiles and 34 for the crime
scene profiles. Contrary to UK policy on inter-
national DNA exchange [39], the 2016 report of the
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Biometrics Commissioner indicates instances where
data of subjects have been exchanged with associ-
ated personal information at the first stage [34]. A
second issue identified was the searching of DNA
data related to offences other than qualifying (ser-
ious) offences [9,34]. Thirdly, there were instances
where NDNAD searches were conducted without
the approval of the Database Strategy Board [9,34].
The Biometrics Commissioner notes that measures
have been implemented to address these issues and
prevent future occurrence.
Like the UK, the request-based system is prac-
ticed through bilateral agreements by the US with
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Malta, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, the Netherlands and
other states [41–67]. These bilateral agreements are
modelled as the EU Pr€um regime. However, there is
a focus on serious crime and parties exercise auton-
omy in permitting automated searches of databases
based on the principle of reciprocity. The extent of
implementation of the United States bilateral agree-
ments for DNA data exchange is not clear [40].
Conclusion
Over the past 2 decades, the fight against cross-bor-
der crime, terrorism and illegal immigration has
intensified interest in the transnational exchange of
forensic DNA data. It appears the largest exchange
system is the EU Pr€um framework, involving a net-
work of multiple national DNA databases. There is
a possibility for non-EU national (such as Norway,
Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein [21]), inter-
national or regional law enforcement agencies to
partner the Pr€um framework. This potential global
network of databases may introduce significant
“administrative burdens” on national database man-
agers. Further, due to the volume of exchanges,
databases may encounter difficulties in managing
searches and false-positive matches. These challenges
imply a need to develop strong algorithms for com-
parison as well as an expansion of existing standard
set loci to increase the discriminatory power
of profiles.
The review identified a common policy in all the
available systems: the governance of data by domes-
tic legislation and implementation of the two-stage
Pr€um process. Several studies have noted that
national differences in operational, legal and ethical
policies including privacy safeguards and interpret-
ation of proportionality appear to limit the full
potential of the DNA data exchange systems
[37,38,68–71]. The current trend dictates a need for
legal and operational harmonisation of domestic
policies to protect both public security and individ-
ual civil liberties.
Whilst the utility of the DNA exchange system
has been demonstrated in resolving serious crimes
such as gang and serial rape, murder and armed
robbery [12,13,18,24], there is limited information
on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of this
crime-fighting tool [36,72]. This knowledge base is
critical to help establish whether the creation and
operation of DNA exchange systems is “a good
return on investment”.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr.
Carole McCartney and Emmanuel Nsiah Amoako of
Northumbria University School of Law for their com-
ments on the initial draft of the paper.
Authors’ contributions
Aaron Opoku Amankwaa conceived the research, carried
out the literature research, analysed reports and drafted
the manuscript.
Compliance with ethical standards
This work is part of the author’s doctoral research which
has been approved by the Institute’s Ethics Committee.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by
the author.
Funding
This work was undertaken as part of the author’s PhD in
Law at Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK. The doc-
toral research is funded by a Northumbria University
Research Studentship.
ORCID
Aaron Opoku Amankwaa http://orcid.org/0000-0002-
4501-7274
References
[1] Amankwaa A, McCartney C. DNA databases: it’s
still far from clear how effective they are in fighting
crime [Internet]. The Conversation. 2017; [cited
2017 Nov 20]. Available from: http://theconversa-
tion.com/dna-databases-its-still-far-from-clear-how-
effective-they-are-in-fighting-crime-85137
4 A. O. AMANKWAA
[2] Maguire CN, McCallum LA, Storey C, et al.
Familial searching: a specialist forensic DNA
profiling service utilising the National DNA
DatabaseVR to identify unknown offenders via their
relatives—the UK experience. Forensic Sci Int
Genet. 2014;8:1–9.
[3] Lammers M, Bernasco W. Are mobile offenders
less likely to be caught? The influence of the geo-
graphical dispersion of serial offenders’ crime loca-
tions on their probability of arrest. Eur J Criminol.
2013;10:168–186.
[4] Bernasco W, Lammers M, van der Beek K. Cross-
border crime patterns unveiled by exchange of
DNA profiles in the European Union. Secur J.
2016;29:640–660.
[5] McCartney C. Forensic DNA sampling and the
England and Wales National DNA Database: a
sceptical approach. Crit Criminol. 2004;12:
157–178.
[6] Dahl JY, Saetnan AR. “It all happened so slowly” –
On controlling function creep in forensic DNA
databases. Int J Law Crime Justice. 2009;37:83–103.
[7] Amankwaa AO, McCartney C. The UK National
DNA Database: Implementation of the Protection
of Freedoms Act 2012. Forensic Sci Int. 2018;284:
117–128.
[8] Amankwaa AO. Forensic DNA retention: public
perspective studies in the United Kingdom and
around the world. Sci Justice. 2018;58:455–464.
[9] Wiles P. Annual Report 2017: Commissioner for
the Retention and Use of Biometric Material.
London: Office of the Biometrics Commissioner;
2018.
[10] CTED, UNOCT. United Nations Compendium of
recommended practices for the responsible use
and sharing of biometrics in counter-terrorism.
New York (NY): Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate; 2018.
[11] Butler J. Advanced topics in forensic DNA typing:
methodology. London: Elsevier; 2012.
[12] INTERPOL. INTERPOL handbook on DNA data
exchange and practice. 2nd ed. Lyon: INTERPOL;
2009.
[13] INTERPOL. Forensics: DNA [Internet].
INTERPOL. 2018 [cited 2018 Mar 23]. Available
from: https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expert-
ise/Forensics/DNA
[14] Home Office. Government sets out case for joining
Pr€um [Internet]. GOV.UK. 2015 [cited 2018 Jul 5].
Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/government-sets-out-case-for-joining-prum
[15] Harriss L, Davis K. Biometrics Technologies.
POSTNotes [Internet]. 2018; [cited 2018 Jul 3];
POST-PN-0578. Available from: https://research-
briefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/
POST-PN-0578
[16] Home Office. Pr€um business and implementation
case. London: Home Office; 2015.
[17] Protection of Freedoms Act [Internet]. Sect. 16
2012. Available from: http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2012/9/contents/enacted
[18] INTERPOL. Project Pink Panthers [Internet].
INTERPOL. 2018 [cited 2018 Mar 28]. Available
from: https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/
Organized-crime/Project-Pink-Panthers#
[19] Europol. Europol Information System (EIS) Leaflet
[Internet]. Europol. 2013 [cited 2018 Jun 6].
Available from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/
publications-documents/europol-information-system-
eis-leaflet
[20] Europol. Europol Programming Document: 2018 –
2020. Hague: Europol; 2018.
[21] Council of the European Union. Draft Council
Conclusions on the implementation of the “PR€UM
DECISIONS” ten years after their adoption
[Internet]. Brussels: Council of the European
Union; 2018 [cited 2018 Jul 11]. Available from:
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
10550-2018-INIT/en/pdf
[22] Council of the European Union. Council Decision
2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up
of cross-border cooperation, particularly in com-
bating terrorism and cross-border crime. Off J Eur
Union. 2008;1–11.
[23] Council of the European Union. Council Decision
2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementa-
tion of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up
of cross-border cooperation, particularly in com-
bating terrorism and cross-border crime. Off J Eur
Union. 2008;12–72.
[24] Toom V. Cross-border exchange and comparison
of forensic DNA data in the context of the Pr€um
decision. Brussels: European Parliament; 2018.
[25] Home Office. National DNA Database statistics: Q2
2018 to 2019 [Internet]. GOV.UK. 2018 [cited 2018
Dec 12]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/statistics/national-dna-database-statistics
[26] Santos F, Machado H, Silva S. Forensic DNA data-
bases in European countries: is size linked to per-
formance? Life Sci Soc Policy. 2013;9:12.
[27] S and Marper v The United Kingdom [Internet].
2008 [cited 2016 Mar 11]. Available from: http://
www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581.html
[28] MacGregor A. Annual report 2014: Commissioner
for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material.
London: Office of the Biometrics Commissioner;
2014.
[29] House of Lords. Pr€um: UK Opt-in [Internet].
Hansard Online. 2015 [cited 2018 Mar 26].
Available from: https://hansard.parliament.uk/
Lords/2015-12-09/debates/15120956000220/Pr%C3%
BCmUKOpt-In
[30] Lewis B. Implementation of Pr€um [Internet].
GOV.UK. 2016 [cited 2018 Mar 26]. Available
from: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/eu-home-affairs-subcommittee/
Implementation-of-Prum-19-Oct.pdf
[31] European Union Committee. Brexit: future
UK–EU security and police cooperation. London:
House of Lords; 2016.
[32] Haves E. Proposed UK-EU Security Treaty. House
of Lords Library Briefings [Internet]. 2018 [cited
2018 Dec 29]; Available from: https://researchbrief-
ings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/LLN-
2018-0058
[33] European Union Committee. The United
Kingdom’s participation in Pr€um. London: House
of Lords; 2015.
[34] Wiles P. Annual Report 2016: Commissioner for
the Retention and Use of Biometric Material. UK:
Office of the Biometrics Commissioner; 2017.
[35] Council of the European Union. Implementation
of the provisions on information exchange of the
FORENSIC SCIENCES RESEARCH 5
“Pr€um Decisions.” Brussels: Council of the
European Union; 2017.
[36] Santos F, Machado H. Patterns of exchange of
forensic DNA data in the European Union
through the Pr€um system. Sci Justice. 2017; 57:
307–313.
[37] McCartney C, Wilson TJ, Williams R.
Transnational exchange of forensic DNA: viability,
legitimacy, and acceptability. Eur J Crim Policy
Res. 2011; 17:305–322.
[38] McCartney C. Forensic data exchange: ensuring
integrity. Aust J Forensic Sci. 2015; 47:36–48.
[39] Home Office. International DNA exchange policy
for the United Kingdom. London: Home Office;
2015.
[40] ENFSI DNA Working Group. DNA database man-
agement review and recommendations. Wiesbaden:
ENFSI; 2017.
[41] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Argentina [Internet]. Mar 23, 2016. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/279149.pdf
[42] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Austria [Internet]. Nov 15, 2010. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/262240.pdf
[43] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Bulgaria [Internet]. Oct 10, 2012. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/259255.pdf
[44] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Chile [Internet]. May 30, 2013. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/276471.pdf
[45] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Croatia [Internet]. Feb 16, 2011. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/258453.pdf
[46] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Cyprus [Internet]. Dec 1, 2015. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/276007.pdf
[47] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Czech Republic [Internet]. Nov 12, 2008.
Available from: https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/258001.pdf
[48] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Denmark [Internet]. Oct 14, 2010. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/183505.pdf
[49] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Estonia [Internet]. Sep 29, 2008. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/180796.pdf
[50] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Finland [Internet]. Mar 17, 2010. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/258266.pdf
[51] Agreement Between the United States of America
and France [Internet]. May 11, 2012. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/259780.pdf
[52] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Germany [Internet]. Oct 1, 2008. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/258004.pdf
[53] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Greece [Internet]. Jun 28, 2009. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/258003.pdf
[54] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Hungary [Internet]. Oct 1, 2008. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/180798.pdf
[55] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Iceland [Internet]. May 14, 2012. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/259411.pdf
[56] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Ireland [Internet]. Jul 21, 2011. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/258454.pdf
[57] Agreement Between the United States of America and
Italy [Internet]. May 28, 2009. Available from: https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/257783.pdf
[58] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Latvia [Internet]. Sep 29, 2008. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/168857.pdf
[59] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Liechtenstein [Internet]. Jun 27, 2012.
Available from: https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/279814.pdf
[60] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Lithuania [Internet]. Oct 29, 2008. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/182447.pdf
[61] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Malta [Internet]. Oct 3, 2008. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/182847.pdf
[62] Agreement Between the United States of America
and New Zealand [Internet]. Mar 20, 2013.
Available from: https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/277051.pdf
[63] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Portugal [Internet]. Jun 30, 2009. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/257781.pdf
[64] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Romania [Internet]. Oct 5, 2015. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/276413.pdf
[65] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Slovenia [Internet]. Sep 13, 2012. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/260333.pdf
[66] Agreement Between the United States of America
and Sweden [Internet]. Dec 16, 2011. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/265947.pdf
[67] Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Slovak Republic [Internet]. Oct 8, 2008.
Available from: https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/182443.pdf
[68] Johnson D, Ludwig A, Younger B. The Pr€um
Implementation, Evaluation and Strengthening
(P.I.E.S.) of Forensic DNA Data Exchange:
Northumbria University Final Report. Newcastle
Upon Tyne: Northumbria University; 2015.
[69] Santos F. Overview of the implementation of the
Pr€um Decisions. EXCHANGE. 2016; 1–25.
6 A. O. AMANKWAA
[70] Santos F. The transnational exchange of DNA
data: global standards and local practices. In:
Jakobs K, Blind K, editors. Proc 22nd EURAS
Annu Stand Conf Digit Chall Oppor Stand.
Aachen: Verlag Mainz; 2017.
[71] Machado H, Granja R. Ethics in transnational foren-
sic DNA data exchange in the EU: Constructing
boundaries and managing controversies. Science as
Culture. 2018;27:242–264.
[72] Taverne MD, Broeders APA. The light’s at the end
of the funnel! – evaluating the effectiveness of the
transnational exchange of DNA profiles between
the Netherlands and other Pr€um countries. the
Netherlands: Paris Legal Publishers; 2015.
FORENSIC SCIENCES RESEARCH 7
